E&OE
DAVID JOHNSTON:
Ladies and gentlemen, are you all set to go? Good afternoon and welcome to one our routine operational updates. I know there's a few new participants here that haven't joined us in the past. Welcome. My name is David Johnston, I'm the Chief of Joint Operations. I'm joined by Air Commodore Joe Iervasi, who leads the operations in joint operations command, who has responsibilities towards the conduct of our air operations in the Middle East. But we will- and the reason why we've gone for an afternoon rather than the normal morning media update, we have at the end of the telephone with us Colonel Matt Galton who is the Commander of Task Group Taji. It's early in the morning in Iraq at the moment, and I think for Matt it's about 7 o'clock in the morning. But that's the reason why we have shifted the time zone for the conduct of the update this afternoon.
And I will give Matt the opportunity to give an update on our operations for the Building Partner Capacity mission, and as we've done in the past, we will then open up for a question and answer session. We'll be happy to take any of your questions on operations related issues. But it is good to have you here. I will start and just give you the normal overview on operations generally. Air Commodore Iervasi will cover some of our current air operations contribution, and as I mentioned Colonel Galton from Iraq will tell you what he and his team have been doing.
But for the other view for Iraq generally, in the weeks since my last update to you there's been significant commentary about the Iraqi security forces and in particular its will to fight [indistinct]. So what we have observed occur in Ramadi and its fall to date. The performance of the Iraqi security forces has been variable. That is an accurate statement. I'll comment on Ramadi in particular in a moment but I'd first just like to address the question, or the issue about will to fight and what it means. Like any military course, our own included, the resolve of a fighting force is of course influenced by many factors and they include the leadership of the fighting force, the confidence that it has through its training, the equipment that's available to it and the motivation for the activities that it is performing. All of those are factors that when we discuss and look at the will to fight, and each of them is variable within your own security forces. So understanding the circumstances that occurred in Ramadi, that I will refer to in a minute, both the general disposition and capacity of the Iraqi army is not an element that you can take Ramadi in isolation to other operations across Iraq. And we will talk through some of those.
In some places we do though, as you have seen, Iraqi security forces have fought exceptionally hard. I briefed on a number of occasions at the Baiji oil refinery, which is near the city of Baiji to the north of Baghdad, where the Iraqi counter-terrorism service and other guards and soldiers have been in a heavy fight for the last, sort of since the 18 of June, at least 12 months now, where they have held that facility often under enormous pressure from Daesh who see it as a very strategic point for them. I'll admit there has been some ebbs and flows in Baiji, particularly in the oil refinery, but the Iraqi security force has maintained at all times a foothold there. But I just offered that as an example of the will to fight is not something that is just particular to Ramadi, you've got much broader than that. In other areas we've seen Iraqi security forces also being successful. They've helped reign in Baghdad, Tikrit with [indistinct] more recently and Baiji as I mentioned, but the Baiji environment, not just limited to the Baiji oil refinery. And recently, they are now starting operations, what I'd call preparatory operations to recover Ramadi but there is some way to go there.
In the north the Kurdish security forces have also been successful. They've cleared eleven villages and installed security in Kirkuk province, which has resulted in Daesh losing what we would call freedom of movement across a quarter of the territory that up to a year ago they had held. But there had also been successes in the north. More recently, in part to the provision of additional equipment, mostly from the US, the Iraqi security forces have been able to repel suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and have managed to disrupt a number of attacks in areas they are now holding to the north and to the east of Fallujah where there have been some particularly fierce clashes right through an area known as the Thar Thar region which is part of the gateway and entry into Baghdad and Ramadi.
But it's important that I also recognise that concurrently Daesh have achieved some tactical successes. They continue to hold the Nineveh Province in the north, specifically around the towns of Sinjar, Tal Afar and Mosul as well as parts of Kirkuk and Salah ad Din provinces. And it occupies some territory surrounding and to the north of the Euphrates River, which you know flows out to the west Baghdad. In the past week we've seen Daesh cut off some water supplies from Ramadi dam to neighbouring districts where the Iraqi security forces and militias are operating in order to make the circumstances on the ground more difficult for the Iraqi forces.
Now it is important though that we remember the suffering of innocent Iraqis, the civilians at the hands of this. Townships seized by Daesh are facing widespread shortages of essential food stuffs, fuel, electricity and water. From Iraqi news reports we're aware that the prices of fuel, bread and other goods have risen significantly in areas that Daesh now hold. And as I've mentioned, Daesh does use water as a weapon by diverting it away from certain areas that deny water to people.
In other areas, there is cause for optimism. Iraq is on track produce 3.75 million barrels of oil a day and the government has indicated that it plans to boost production by 800,000 barrels a day, mainly from the southern oil fields and installations that have not been impacted by the fierce fighting in the north. Given that 80 per cent of Iraq's revenue is derived from oil, these are promising signs that Iraq can have a more prosperous future once it's removed the Daesh threat from its lands.
Turning specifically to Ramadi now, as I've mentioned in all my previous updates, the tactical setbacks of military operations are not uncommon. And there's no denying the fact that Daesh keeping control of Ramadi has been a setback. But the campaign is much more than a single battle. Variable perofrmance of the Iraqi security forces during the Daesh offensive in Ramadi underlines the ongoing need for both the advice and the Building Partner Capacity roles that Australia, New Zealand and other Coalition parties are committed to.
That is why Building Partner Capacity missions that we're engaged in is important to assist the Iraqis in building the skills and the confidence that they need to retake and regain sovereignty of their country. We need to remember that Daesh had been waging a campaign to seize Ramadi for approximately 18 months. This is not a short-term battle that has been there. It's a big city that's faced continued armed engagement between Daesh militants and Iraqi security forces. The recent withdrawal of Iraqi forces was only in the face of explosions that were big enough to level an entire city plot that was the result of large, vehicle-borne IEDs detonated by Daesh.
The US State Department reports that there were 30 or 40 of these large vehicle-borne IEDs wer used in Ramadi. I also point out that concurrently with the operations in Ramadi, there were some 75,000 Iraqi security forces who were tasked with providing support to the Kadhimiya pilgrimage, which is an important pilgrimage that was concurrently occurring north of Baghdad.
So the spread of Iraqi security forces through this period, particularly in the later part of the day, Daesh managed to gain access to the control of Ramadi support. Now we do need to carefully assess and draw the right conclusions about the strategic importance of Ramadi and other contested areas of Iraq. This is an Iraqi fight and an Iraqi plan that we are working to. And as you're aware, it has been supported by a pan-Arab coalition and local partnership of more than 60 countries, all which share a common interest with Iraq, the destruction of Daesh and its corrupt ideology. It has taken many months and it will continue to take many months before we see significant signs that Daesh is in defeat.
I would now like to turn to the Building Partner Capacity mission and introduce to you Colonel Matt Galton. Matt leads the Task Group Taji, which as you're aware, is a task group that advises both Australian and New Zealand soldiers. And Matt, if you're with us, good morning and it's good to hear from you.
MATT GALTON:
Hello good morning [indistinct] and good afternoon to everyone there [indistinct]. It's quite a chilly 33 odd degrees at the moment but I'm sure we'll be building for a 49 later on this afternoon.
[Indistinct] Iraq and around the [indistinct] a really great handover we have with the US Army here [indistinct] New Zealand has [indistinct] 76 Iraqi Army Brigade. In preparation [indistinct] and we [indistinct] very well [indistinct] scenarios [indistinct] with the soldiers that are likely to place over here and I don't know what else to reply except that [indistinct]. One important part of our preparations has been the integration of the New Zealand and Australian soldiers, ensuring that we will get to work side by side together in a training environment before coming out here and working side by side. All of those have been very eager and we've been working very closely with our Coalition partners [indistinct] sharing the focus with US here and [indistinct] training so far [indistinct] the regular Iraqi Army.
Task Group Taji is currently training the 76th Iraqi Army Brigade; a formation within the Iraqi 16th Division. The Brigade totals approximately 1100 personnel comprising command, support and infantry elements. The total training audience on a daily basis is approximately 750 Iraqi Army soldiers however can fluctuate depending on other barracks duties being undertaken within the Brigade. Iraqi Security Forces have been very responsive to the training techniques of the Task Group. The training is conducted by approximately 70 Australian and New Zealand soldiers, enabled by the use of interpreters. We also utilise other elements of the task group to support the delivery of training. The Iraqi soldiers and officers have responded enthusiastically to the Australian and New Zealand trainers and are enjoying the training they are receiving. There has been an increase in the number Iraqi officers prepared to lead training which has been a positive sign and is encouraged by the Australian and New Zealand trainers. I think this demonstrates that the training has been effective so far, but there is still a lot work to be done. Training has covered a diverse range of military skills that the Iraqi Security Forces will require to defeat Daesh (ISIS). Instruction has focused on developing both officers and soldiers including weapon handling, building clearances, obstacle breaching techniques, as well as developing tactics, techniques and procedures from small group (squad) through to larger scale (company-level) operations. The trainers are also reinforcing international humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict with the Iraqi forces.
If there's anything [indistinct] Brigade [indistinct] which we are working towards them having, the progress has been steady but [indistinct] three or four weeks of training and that is quite a short period of time [indistinct]. 76 Bridge [indistinct] and I know that training will be [indistinct] of every relation [indistinct] to getting back out on operation. But rightly, it is very difficult to know how many [indistinct] individual soldiers [indistinct]. So [indistinct] new [indistinct] and ensure we can instil some confidence in to the operative soldiers in the 76 Brigade.
[Indistinct] very capable and very [indistinct] and there's been three difficulties to date [indistinct]. But we're doing all we can to [indistinct] prepare 76 Brigade [indistinct] what we all recognise what is going to be a very tough time for them. So I know [indistinct] has been talking about it a lot [indistinct] and what has been going over [indistinct] looking forward and not just [indistinct] but also looking ahead, which is critical [indistinct]. So what we're trying to crack as well is [indistinct] their confidence, which is three things [indistinct]. Confidence in the procedures that we're training them in, confidence in the [indistinct] issues and I think most importantly, confidence in the man that's fighting alongside them and [indistinct] is no different [indistinct] or New Zealand [indistinct]. The only [indistinct] is [indistinct] and from what I've seen out there [indistinct] Australia and New Zealand soldiers passionately have [indistinct] appreciate what the Iraqi soldiers and the Iraqi [indistinct]. In that, particular appreciation for federal and [indistinct]. This approach has led to [indistinct] in a short period of time [indistinct] that we've been running [indistinct].
So the 76th Brigade will graduate from the current force towards the end of this month and [indistinct] operations shortly after that. Now I'm confident that the Task Group are doing everything we can to prepare them for this fight, however it is going to be difficult to assess day-by-day but we will obviously monitor the appropriate [indistinct] training. [Indistinct] towards the next brigade and we're just working on that now [indistinct].
DAVID JOHNSTON:
Thanks mate. We'll keep Matt Galton dialled in, as long as our technology holds up and provide the opportunity to questions, including to him, after we've finished. If I could perhaps just summarise some of that training mission, you'd be aware in total 13 bases providing the building part to capacity, support roles across a number of sites, al-Asad, [indistinct] our own at Taji, and in [indistinct] itself. More than 3200 Iraqi soldiers are currently under training at these sites, and 9000 have already completed their training, but that throughput has been very important. The Iraqi Army has also recently received new equipment from the United States, including small arms, anti-tank weapons, and counter-improvised explosive devices equipment. All of this is important in terms of building their confidence and capability taking fire. In the Advise and Assist mission, which our special operations task group is continuing to perform, that has been going very well. One example I would give to you, even in the difficult circumstances that were faced in Ramadi the counter terrorism service that we are engaged in providing that assistance to was one of the last unit to break contact out of that circumstance and only once the resources for them to sustain themselves in that environment were no longer available. I will now move to airstrike operations and I will advise Air Commodore Iervasi to give you an update on the aircraft that was used to the operations over Iraq.
VINCENT IERVASI:
Thanks sir. Now two coalition air operations, the 18 nations involved in providing air support have completed more than 2745 missions in Iraq and four and a half thousand airstrikes in Iraq and Syria since Operation Inherent Resolve began. It is an intensive but carefully executed air campaign that continues to disrupt and destroy the great Daesh war machine. Material losses for Daesh have been high, including vehicles, artillery, mortars, and personnel. All loses number in their thousands. The Australian Air Task Group has continued to operate at a high tempo. Last month the FA18A, or Classic Hornets, flew 66 sorties against deliberate and dynamic targets, delivering 45 GPS guided 500 pound bombs, making this the second most active month for the Air Task Group since operations commenced for us in September last year. The strike's contributions so far is 602 sorties delivering 284 bombs with an average sortie duration 7.8 hours. Maintaining our eye in the sky for the Coalition has been our E7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft which has continued to provide battle space command and control of all coalition force aircraft in support of the Iraqi security forces. There contribution to date is 107 sorties, with an average sortie duration of twelve hours. Our KC30 Multi Role Tanker Transport has also maintained its function of helping sustain the coalition of strike fighter aircraft on station, delivering 1.5 million litres of fuel last month alone. That's the equivalent to about 40 B-double fuel trucks. Their total contribution to date has been 13.4 million litres, or 335 B-double fuel trucks, over 282 sorties, with an average duration of eight hours. While the complexity on the ground has increased, in particular the differentiation of friend and foe, the intelligence picture in Iraq continues to improve.
Airstrikes continue to precisely target Daesh while managing the risk to civilians. At times the risk to civilians being injured in an attack outweighs the value of destroying Daesh targets. In some circumstances we'll choose to wait until that balance shifts. You may have heard a figure of about 75 per cent of coalition aircraft returning to base without delivering weapons, our figures are consistent with that. This is a direct consequence of Daesh choosing to embed themselves amongst the civilian population making targeting from the air more difficult. At the end of the day there have been no Australian strikes which have resulted in civilian injury or death. Whilst there are challenges in directly targeting Daesh, airstrikes have been successful in targeting the means by which Daesh wages its war.
Coalition airstrikes at oil production facilities and supply lines are believed to have reduced Daesh revenues by between 25 and 75 per cent from their historic highs. According to one US intelligence source revenues from oil alone are believed to be as low as $270,000 a day. As mentioned by Admiral Johnston, Daesh have been using the denial of water or the target of [indistinct] to provide them with advantage on the ground. Our airstrike missions have been bombing these small dams that Daesh have been building across the Euphrates River. Lasting breaches in the earthen walls to restore water flow have denied Daesh the ability to use the dams as bridges for their fighters across the river. The coalition airstrikes are providing time and space for the Iraqi security forces to train and build the necessary capabilities for them to fight and win.
DAVID JOHNSTON:
I'll just finish with a short update on Afghanistan. [Indistinct] will inform you of a change in the command arrangements that we have in place. We've just made an adjustment with General Mulhall, who was previously the Joint Taskforce commander here in Afghanistan, has returned and will arrive at the airport very recently after what has been an extremely successful period of command for him. He was instrumental not only in working with Afghan National Defence and Security Forces but in part assisting Australia with our transitions from the ISAF led mission to where we are now with the Resolute Support mission. Rear Admiral Trevor Jones is now the Joint Taskforce Commander for operations that include the task group in Afghanistan. Trevor Jones works out of our Middle East base there where he now has command of operations on the ground from Iraq through to Afghanistan and our maritime contribution as well. In Afghanistan itself Colonel Susan Coyle has assumed command of Task Group Afghanistan and she works in the country there and is our lead for the operational effect that we are achieving on an ongoing basis in those missions. If I could close then and just reiterate, particularly across the summary that we have given today on operations in Iraq, since my last update there has been a period of gains and losses. The Australian contribution remains valued and effective and I am confident it will continue to do so. It's early days for our training mission in Task Group Taji and I am also very confident that they have got the right approach and the skill sets to provide a very useful training role for the Iraqi security forces. Our objective of course remains to support the Government of Iraq to enable it to be successful and regain sovereignty over its territory. I'm very happy now to take any questions that you may have of either Commodore Iervasi or I, and Colonel Galton in the Middle East.
QUESTION:
For you admiral, the US is sending more troops, the Prime Minister has said we might, does that suggest that this model of deployment is working or not working?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
As the US [indistinct], President Obama just very recently announced was supporting their current missions. The US has not changed its mission, its focus, like ours, remains training the Iraqi security forces on the ground. The additional contribution of about 450 people that was announced is about supporting particular operations in Ramadi where the US is looking at establishing a further advise and assisted training site in that location. What they are aiming to achieve in part is to engage more directly with the Iraqi security forces that are operating in that area, to assist them in their conduct of their operations and the way they integrate their forces together. That has proved more difficult to do if you're outside of Ramadi. We operate from one of the bases further up to the north west of Anbar, it's quite a distance from Ramadi itself, and Baghdad equally has Fallujah in between it. So the advantage of what the US has done is reinforce the mission, but go to where a recognised additional contribution is required, and establish that [indistinct].
QUESTION:
Is that what we need to do?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
Ourselves? So we're currently still the second-highest contributor behind the US in Iraq. Our role is still very similar to theirs. We're involved in the air campaign, the training role, so we are a significant contributor already and our mission is the equivalent of what the US is doing. We are supporting some of the counter-terrorism services that are working in Ramadi and [indistinct]. We are part of that framework,
QUESTION:
The Prime Minister, Sir, says that we are talking with our allies about what more we can do. What would you tell the Prime Minister you believe we could do more than we're currently doing now? What advice would you give him on that question?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
That would be something I would discuss up through my Chief of Defence Force to the Prime Minister, rather than provide that advice here. I'm confident that the campaign is the right campaign. Largely because that's what the Government in Iraq wants. Now I know there's been discussions around an accompanying role or having coalition forces go outside the wire and accompany Iraqi security forces on the ground. That is not what the government in Iraq is seeking from those partners that are supporting them. The strategy that we have [indistinct] about supporting the government in Iraq in a manner that is consistent with what the Iraqis want is the appropriate approach. How we-the capacity inside the system to generate that is an area that we continue to keep under review. We do talk both with the Government in Iraq and our coalition partners, but that's about how to reinforce the current [indistinct].
QUESTION:
I understand why you mightn't talk specific tactics with us and rather than with the Command, but in general, is there more we can do? Is there additional capacity that Australia could easily bring to this that could be fruitful?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
There's two parts to your question: Is there more that countries [indistinct] can do to support Iraq? And that in part depends on what the Iraqis want for themselves. They're not asking Australia at the moment for an additional capacity on the ground or otherwise. We have a military force that's very capable and very professional, but we're not getting asked to provide that additional support for the Iraqis, and that's the key element. But because we're also the second largest contributor, one of the questions and issues for our government is should others be doing more, if there was a requirement for more to be done, rather than Australia adding to its current contribution.
QUESTION:
How would we assess the capability of the Iraqis that we are training, as far as them going [indistinct]?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
I would like to just particularly say I'm aware the microphone is down this end and if there are questions at the other end of the table, Matt may not hear them, but I'll repeat them for you. Matt, the question was your assessment about the capabilities and status of those elements of the Iraqi Security Forces that you have been training.
MATT GALTON:
Okay, yeah. We've only had the 76th Brigade come to us so far, so that's the only one I can comment on first-hand. They came to us with some pretty basic skills, they do have a very, very [indistinct] and a couple of very good leaders [indistinct] the way that they've approached the training, they've taken to roles pretty well. I think [indistinct]. [Inaudible].
QUESTION: And how have you assessed the governance(*) in Iraq? The Iraqi government and the Iraqi military?
MATT GALTON:
Well [indistinct]. So, there's a reason [indistinct]. There [indistinct] supporters [indistinct] command [indistinct] make sure that their [indistinct] looked after. So, I don't [indistinct] and [indistinct].
QUESTION:
As you say, [indistinct] what happens in Ramadi and about the will to fight. Would you have an opinion, though, on the resourcing of the Iraqi forces? Were they let down?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
That's difficult for me to judge because I don't [indistinct] have the insights(*) of them. It is true resourcing parts of the Sunni elements alliance, and that's Ramadi is, as you're aware, is part of the Sunni heartland. That has been an issue-partly why our government and others have impressed upon[*] on the government in Iraq to be inclusive in its nature; to recognise that resolving both-not only to support the Shia elements of the government in Iraq, but the Sunni elements are key. Ramadi is now clearly causing that to be re-evaluated. The US decision [indistinct] providing additional capabilities and [indistinct], where they will be. We'll be part of the strategy with the government of Iraq to improve resourcing in that western province area. It will need to be improved, in order to be successful in recovering that territory.
QUESTION:
[Indistinct] so, they were let down?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
I'm not sure-I can't say how much they had. In part, what I've also wished to make clear because it's context. The way the strikes occurred in Ramadi - and I mentioned the 30 or 40 extraordinarily large [indistinct] IEDs [indistinct] that is one - they use garbage trucks or heavy moving vehicles, that's on their own had sufficient explosives in it to destroy a city block. So, the tactics that they choose clearly were - came as something of a surprise and had enormous effect on the psychology of the forces that were operating in that area. So, that in combination with a whole range of developments, including their resources available to them all were a factor in what's occurred in Ramadi but they will have to be better resourced [indistinct].
QUESTION:
[Indistinct] Can you elaborate [indistinct] to move past that [indistinct] Australia [indistinct] what sort of timeframe would you like to [indistinct]?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
I do but I can't say for very obvious reasons. There are plenty of others who are interested in understanding what the Iraqi Government [indistinct] and how the Coalition supporting it. What I can say is what I describe - the preparatory actions are underway so it will be - Ramadi's a very large area. The actions to recover it will not occur in a day or a week. It will be months. So it requires a degree of prepatory actions to put forces in the right position, train them, make sure that they're equipped for it, that have had the strategy that will contain and isolate the area so that they can't actively(*) continue to reinforce it. That broad work is under way but I [indistinct] it would be inappropriate for me to give a timeframe indication. What I would offer is the Iraqi Government will act as soon as it is ready to do so. They're very aware that Ramadi is a very important element to them and that they have to recover that territory.
QUESTION:
And Australia is involved in advisory and assist training.
DAVID JOHNSTON:
We are. We are. I've mentioned we do have forces out in the al-Anbar district that we have partnered with counterterrorism service forces that work in that area and we are [indistinct] of assisting the local Iraq units that [indistinct] the strategy and the tactics that they will employ as part of that operation.
QUESTION:
Air Commodore can I just - you spoke about the [indistinct] of air strikes [indistinct] population, there've probably been a massive, quite sizeable amounts of arms, you know, that the Iraqis have left or the Iraqi Army has left. Is that creating a problem as well? I mean, [indistinct] using those vehicles which are apparently [indistinct] problem [indistinct]?
VINCENT IERVASI:
So, certainly that complicates the situation on the ground and for identification. We're now seeing Daesh time and time - less quick from on the ground as well. So, this is where it's critically important that we have good eyes on the sort of ground to understand who's operating that equipment from time to time. Unless we can be satisfied the [indistinct] Daesh or Daesh affiliates then we'll hold on to [indistinct]. But it is complicated. It's probably one of the most complicated operating environments of the last few decades.
QUESTION:
Is [indistinct] common, they're using them more and more - like is it widespread or is it unusual for them to be using that sort of materiel?
VINCENT IERVASI:
I don't think it's a trait necessarily that Daesh has a [indistinct] one. If you go through any conflict, any game force will take whatever is available to them on the battlefield so it's not an uncommon [indistinct] field in force will use what is available to them.
QUESTION:
Are you aware of any Australians involved in [indistinct] in the Daesh leadership?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
In the leadership itself? Not on a significant level though but I think as we've indicated in the past, there are other parts of our government that puts that more intensively than I do. But from my perspective, not that we see them having a large military affect or involvement in the Daesh Military Camp.
QUESTION:
Vice Admiral, following on from the Paris confernece suggested that we need to do more in terms of rolling out [indistinct]. Is that a possibility?
DAVID JOHNSTON:
I've mentioned right from the start that the department - that's not what the Government of Iraq has asked. But having forces on the ground in a combat role or even conducting combat courses does change risk equations significantly. So, while there may be operational futility by having courses in a position, in the absence of a Government of Iraq seeking it and because of the other elements that it brings on, it changes the perception and the intensity of us being there. Are we there to fight ourselves or are we there in a supporting role with the Iraqis? There are many dynamics that change if you move into that [indistinct] role. My view at the moment is it's not necessary, there are other ways we can continue to work to achieve that effect that government of Iraq wants to achieve but most importantly, they're not asking for it so it would be inappropri
