Press conference with Vice Admiral David Johnston and Air Commodore Vincent ‘Joe’ Iervasi – Update on Australian Defence Force operations

E&OE

DAVID JOHNSTON:

[Indistinct, laughs]. That's a tough comparison I could make. I wouldn't generally put myself in the category of either of those two.

QUESTION:      

[Indistinct].

DAVID JOHNSTON:

Yeah, yes. Are you all ready to go? Good morning all; welcome to an update on the Australian Defence Force operations. I have met most of you … Annika [indistinct] might be the first time. For those of you I haven't met, my name is Vice Admiral David Johnston and I am the Chief of Joint Operations. I'm joined this morning by Air Commodore Iervasi, the Director-General of Air Operations. A number of you will have met Joe previously. He is the subject matter expert on air task group operations and will be able to answer some of the questions that you might have, once certainly you've seen some of the material we'll cover this morning.

I will provide first an update on ADF operations in the broad. Of course I will cover Iraq and Syria and give you an updated view on events in that area of operation. I'll spend about 15 minutes going through and providing that, and then happy to take you questions or arguments.

I'd like to start with – in the ADF contribution to Fiji, and just update you on the nature of the role we have performed there. You will be aware in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Winston, which caused significant damage, fatalities and loss of property, in taking the- by the Fijian estimate, about 350,000 people, particularly on the northern side of the main island and out in the remote islands to the northeast of the northern part of Fiji. In the aftermath of that cyclone, and in support of the government response, the ADF quickly established an airbridge[indistinct] between Townsville, Brisbane and into Suva [indistinct], which enabled us to very rapidly provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Fiji.

We had surveillance aircraft positioned to enable them to perform an air assessment of the degree of damage, which was particularly useful in the remote areas where aircraft were able to provide quite a unique capability. Concurrent with the air bridge being established, the movement of stores and the air assessment, we began moving helicopters in which were deployed principally to provide a means of transportation to increase the rate of the assessments being performed, and of course to commence the delivery of aid to the more remote communities.

But those first force elements which were the initial part of our contribution were then supplemented by the deployment of the ADF's newest amphibious capability. HMAS Canberra embarked engineering assets, medical teams, helicopters, underwater clearance teams and a range of vehicles and small boats in order to work alongside the Republic of the Fijian military forces, where we focused our systems with Canberra out to the northeast of the main island, particularly in the island of Koro and Taveuni. But the nature of our contribution there was around providing light engineering effect where we conducted a lot of debris removal, restored some critical infrastructure, supplied fresh drinking water and delivered, particularly in the early stage, life saving supplies to those two islands of Koro and Taveuni.

Overall, some of the work that we've performed, we repaired seven primary schools, one high school and two medical centres. At the height of the deployment, approximately 1000 Australian Defence Force personnel were participating in the operation to support Fiji. Up to 24 March, we had flown 35 missions, a combination of C-17s and C-130s, delivered over 500 tonnes of humanitarian aid and stores to the community, and assisted with the internal distribution of a significant amount of stores.

As you would have seen very recently, Canberra, and the amphibious part of the force recently returned to Brisbane where the ship was unloading. Of course we've continued to provide a significant support on the ground; about 200 people providing an engineering effort, that we have still got a number of helicopters, four helicopters operating there as part of the ongoing restoration effort.

What we've found and we've been able to take off the back of significant training work in Canberra and the amphibious force preparation late last year is a demonstration of just how much you can perform both with these ships and the embarked forces with them, which in combination with the airlift operations that we have, both the C-17 and C-130, gave us the ability to demonstrate a rapid response capability to provide support to our regional neighbours in a time of need. Despite the tragic circumstances of the event, one of the real positives has been the daily interaction that we have had with the soldiers, men and women of the Republic of Fijian Military Forces.

The opportunity to work together on the ground in Fiji has been welcomed by both communities, and we've found that there's been a very strong collective sense of purpose in providing humanitarian systems together and enabling us to work shoulder to shoulder with each other.

I turn now to operations in Iraq and Syria, and give you an update from my last briefing to you, which was late last year, and a sense of what has changed on the ground in both of those areas. The Iraqi Government, with significant Coalition support, has commenced and continued counter-offensive operations while continuing to consolidate its position and control over areas that are under its influence. When we last met, the Iraqi security force main focus was on securing Ramadi, which they had, having completed the isolation and commencing to clear the outer approaches. Kurdish Peshmerga had recaptured Sinjar in Northern Iraq and the areas surrounding Baiji, which is between Baghdad and Mosul, that was being secured.

The situation at that time was indicative of a loss of the initiative by Daesh in Iraq. The situation now is that Iraqi security forces have cleared central Ramadi, and as part of an operation called Desert Lynx, and they are currently – they are advancing west along the Euphrates River valley with the aim of securing the city of Hit. They are making steady progress as they move along the Euphrates and have secured several small towns as they progress towards their objective. Concurrently, a separate Iraqi force in the north, along the Tigris River valley are conducting consolidation operations near Makhmur, which is 70 kilometres south of Mosul. This course is establishing a secure base which will become the point of departure in the advance to secure Mosul.

In the face of this concentrated pressure, Daesh is losing control over previously won(*) territory. While many locations and Iraq and Syria remain exposed to small scale, localised counter-attacks by Daesh, the capacity for Daesh to launch major attacks is considerably diminished. Daesh now finds itself under pressure on multiple fronts in both the Euphrates and Tigris River valleys, as well as the Al-Raqqah and Mosul. Coalition air attacks continue to strike at Daesh ground forces, and sources of financial support across Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Government is focused on securing the Anbar region as its first priority, while undertaking consolidation operations in several other regions.

Australia's contribution remains a key Coalition support in the fight against Daesh. Each of the Australian force elements continues to make significant contributions to the overall commitment in the fight against Daesh. Having enabled over 1000 straight missions against Daesh during the mission to capture Ramadi, the Australian Special Force element, who are conducting the Advise and Assist mission is tending to provide remote based joint terminal attack controller support to the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. The majority of these missions are currently supporting Iraqi operations clear the Euphrates River valley.

Additionally, the Special Operations Task Group continues to support the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service with future operations. CTS, as you will have seen, has been at the forefront of operations to recapture Ramadi, and a combination of training provided by the Advice and Assist mission and the ongoing JTAC assistance to the ground battle has greatly enhanced the CTS combat effectiveness. We are now into the fourth rotation of the Special Operations Task Group, and I would like to acknowledge the vital contribution that the third rotation made, and in particular congratulate them on their significant efforts to support the Counter-Terrorism Service during their recapture of Ramadi.

The recent graduation of the third junior leader's course at Taji recognised the achievements of another 235 junior Iraqi army commanders who have returned to their parent leaders with greatly enhanced skills. This course has evolved into a valuable step towards the professionalization of the Iraqi army. The lessons learned from the ongoing campaign to defeat Daesh have been incorporated into the training to ensure the next generation of leaders of the Iraqi army are better prepared for today's battlefield across Iraq. This has involved a greater focus on combat in complex urban terrain and counter improvised explosive device measures. In addition to the junior leaders course, Task Group Taji continues to train all units and to date has now trained several contingents of the Iraqi army – approximately 4220 personnel.

Since the beginning of 2016, the Air Task Group has conducted 110 strike missions, the majority of which have been two aircraft missions, but a number have involved four aircraft in a single mission, and I'll shortly give you some more detail around a couple of specific examples. They have deployed a total of 273 munitions during those operations. The primary locations for our strike effort has been through the Tigris River Valley, the Kurdish region of operations, including Sinjar and Mosul, the Euphrates River Valley, including Fallujah, Ramadi and Hit, and into Syria. I'll give you some detail on two of the missions that we have performed this year, and after I've concluded my overview we will show you weapon system video of two of those strikes.

On 17 January, the Air Task Group led a major Coalition air strike against a key Daesh underground tunnel complex in central Syria to degrade their ability to resupply and support regional fighters. The mission was successful. It was estimated that the destruction of the complex has effectively destroyed a significant percentage of Daesh weaponry and ammunition stored for use in that area. The complex also served as a Daesh operations node for the Raqqah region. All up, four Australian F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, refuelled en route by our KC-30 air-to-air refueller, delivered eight 2000-pound GPS guided ground penetrating bombs onto the underground complex. The weapons payload carried by the Hornets on this mission was carefully planned using sophisticated damage assessment modelling to achieve the desired effect on the target. The early morning strike was carried out under the cover of darkness in conjunction with a number of other Coalition aircraft that simultaneously struck multiple secondary entrance shafts into the complex to ensure its destruction. We will show you video of that strike shortly.

On 5 March, the Australian Air Task Group led an air strike involving 18 Coalition aircraft against a Daesh defensive fighting position and weapons storage and improvised explosive device production facility in central Iraq, with four Hornets dropping a record 10 2000 GPS guided bombs on the target. Located in a Daesh-controlled area within Anbar province, the facility consisted of a number of weapons storage and IED production sheds that were completely destroyed. The Australian-led strike included Coalition aircraft from five different countries, as well as our air-to-air refuelling aircraft. The 10 2000-pound bombs were the most dropped by an Australian aircraft on a single mission against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The success of these missions highlights the ongoing effectiveness Australian and Coalition airpower is having in diminishing Daesh's ability to conduct operations and control territory in both Iraq and Syria. We will show you weapons system video on that strike as well.

Now, in Afghanistan the ADF presence has increased slightly since my last update to you, with an additional 20 personnel deployed in the Kabul area, bringing the total number of ADF personnel to 270, mainly located in Kabul. We are planning for a small team of Australian media to visit Afghanistan, where they will meet with senior ADF officers, some of the senior Australian Defence staff, and visit the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, where the future leaders of the Afghan forces are trained. We have some very committed instructors providing mentoring and instructional roles within that academy. As with the junior leader course in Taji, our contribution to the training missions is an investment in the future of these countries.

At sea in the Middle East, the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Melbourne handed over maritime security responsibilities to its sister ship, HMAS Darwin, in February, after Melbourne completed five months of operations in support of the Combined Maritime Forces and more than six months away from home. During the five months of operations, Melbourne confiscated and destroyed 977 kilograms of hydrated heroin, seized from five different vessels suspected of smuggling illegal narcotics. These drugs weighed almost as much as a small car and had an Australian street value of around $390 million. On its first patrol, the HMAS Darwin boarding team uncovered and seized a large weapons cache. Operating under the Australian-led Combined Task Force 150, which is responsible for counter-terrorism operations within the maritime region of the Middle East, Darwin intercepted a dhow approximately 300 kilometres of the coast of Oman. After assessing the vessel to be stateless, 1989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, and 20 60mm mortar tubes were seized from the vessel that was headed towards the Somalia coast.

In conclusion, the start of 2016 has seen Iraqi security forces on the counter offensive in the Euphrates River Valley, while performing isolation operations around Mosul and consolidation operations elsewhere in Iraq. As of early 2016, the US Congressional Research Service estimated that Daesh fighters have ceded approximately 40 per cent of the populated territory they once held in Iraq, and between 10 to 20 per cent of the populated territory they had seized in Syria. A number of key Daesh lines of communication and transit between Syria and Iraq had been disrupted, but others remain intact but offer a less direct and less efficient means for them to be able to conduct logistics resupply and movement.

Military air strikes on Daesh-linked oil infrastructure and supply networks have already altered the organisation's financial position. In January of this year, US officials credited a military operation known as Tidal Wave II with reducing Daesh oil revenue by approximately 30 per cent, and oil production by one quarter. This operation consisted of a campaign of targeted air strikes designed in part to incapacitate highly specialised and difficult to replace oil infrastructure under Daesh control. Coalition air strikes in Iraq and Syria continue to restrict Daesh operations. It is too early to predict the date for the counter-offensive on Mosul, which will be determined by the Government of Iraq, but the momentum in the campaign is positive.

Recently I returned from visiting ADF personnel who are performing important peace-keeping roles on the border of Israel and in the Sinai Desert in Egypt. These long-standing operations are being performed in increasingly difficult circumstances, but are crucial to the stability of the nations where this support is being provided. Their efforts and willingness to perform their mission is impressive.

Through the recent high tempo period of operations we have seen in excess of 3000 ADF women and men deployed on operations. In concluding, I would like to recognise the commitment and professionalism of those people, which remains outstanding and reflects extremely well on the ADF and Australia.

Before I take questions, we will now take the opportunity to look at two series of weapon system videos. I mentioned that each of these- the first one is associated with the strike on the cave complex in Syria, and the second one is on the target in Iraq, which was an IED production facility and weapons storage location. Air Commodore Iervasi will then be able to talk you through any of the tactical details associated with those two strikes. And we're happy to pause, replay. I think we've got the technology to do- and that gives you the opportunity to look and ask questions throughout this video. Thank you.

JOE IERVASI:

So what I might do there, sir, is after it starts playing I'll just pause to give you an appreciation of what we've talked about before the actual weapons impact.

QUESTION:

So these are classic Hornets?

JOE IERVASI:

Yes.

So we'll just pause it there. Okay.

Just take it back to the start thank you. Just pause it there and so just to the- those crosshairs, that's not the aircraft delivering the weapons that's another aircraft capturing image of the strike. You'll see the weapons come in from the top left of the screen. The actual target itself, it will be difficult to see, this is actually a night infrared image but what you can just make out is that is a valley and they are two ridgelines. Just to the left of the centre of those cursors, you can see just a very small dark action. That's actually the cave entrance. Now I've designed this particular strike to adjust the attack angle and adjust the weapons to go in through that particular cave was, took a lot of weaponeering (*) targeteering (*) and expertise from the crews in particular. This really highlights that the capability upgrades to classic Hornet in particular over a number of years and weapon that we've got have been certainly fit for purpose.

QUESTION:

So what sort of- is this a bomb that glides, changes the course?

JOE IERVASI:

So this is a GPS guided weapon and we can adjust its terminal attack parameters or impact angle and speed.

QUESTION:

So when you talk about…

DAVID JOHNSTON:

Just pause it there. [Indistinct].

JOE IERVASI:

That's correct yes.

QUESTION:

And the aim of the mission is to close the cave effectively, is it to shut it down?

JOE IERVASI:

So the aim was two-fold, both to shut it down and obviously take out as much stores (*) and functionality of the cave itself in the process.

QUESTION:

So how close is the explosion to the entrance of the cave?

JOE IERVASI:

It's inside the entrance to the cave.

QUESTION:

You actually putting a bomb in the cave?

JOE IERVASI:

Yes.

DAVID JOHNSTON:

[Indistinct] probably see some secondary explosions once Iervasi's been able to take you through, might want to look at it all and then we can have a discussion [indistinct] and we'll pause it there before we go on to the second issue.

JOE IERVASI:

So I've just noticed there that second explosion, that's actually secondary explosions from the explosives that were stored in the cave complex.

And there again.

Now this post strike announces actually the picture is the other way around so the strike occurred as you can imagine the work is coming from your right to the left and that will be looking straight down into the cave entrance this obviously needs [indistinct].

QUESTION:

When's a good time to ask questions so that we…

JOE IERVASI:

Right now.

QUESTION:

We can pause here. Can you give us any idea of how high the aircraft were just in terms of how accurate this was and how big the mouth of the cave was? The size of a football, pool?

JOE IERVASI:

Yeah no the mouth of the cave was like a single garage door entrance. So the aircraft were deployed from a height in the mid 20,000s of feet.

QUESTION:

How many Daesh forces do you believe you killed in this attack?

JOE IERVASI:

We don't have an accurate assessment of who was actually in the cave and the numbers [indistinct] assessment prior to the strike we've been conducting surveillance and patterns of life to determine if the amount of traffic going to and from the cave can classify it but we don't have an accurate assessment of who may have been in the cave at the time of the strike.

QUESTION:

Right do you know how big the cave complex was? Was this a complex of tunnels? I know you guys have conducted attacks on a sophisticated complex of tunnels before. Is this like that or is this simply a fairly shallow storage [indistinct]?

JOE IERVASI:

No we expect that this was actually a complex series of caves and this was the- one of the main entrances to that complex so without being able to determine exactly how complex the network was in between, what we do know place to strike now that this no longer functioned as the node, it's significantly disrupted Daesh around the Raqqah region.

QUESTION:

Was this, you know, a manmade complex of tunnels or a natural complex?

JOE IERVASI:

It could have been both I guess is the bottom line. Using the natural features that are there but as we have seen with Daesh now, they're pretty good at tunnelling as well.

QUESTION:

And how far away were these munitions being dropped off? Like Daesh would presumably not have had any idea that we're on the way?

JOE IERVASI:

That's correct, so I don't want to go into the actual ranges, suffice to say the methods are employed anywhere in excess of 10 kilometres from the target.

QUESTION:

Now we saw a secondary explosion there of the munitions that were inside the cave as a result of the first explosion as it triggered. How much was in there and what were those munitions going to be used for so it's [indistinct] and everything, what were the explosives, what was their intended purpose?

DAVID JOHNSTON:

I think we answered that in the previous question, partly because it's imprecise to know but what they have scored is that it's explosives that they would use for IED use and they pull explosives apart at manufacturing, but then their own small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, that small arms ammunition capability, it's difficult to assess the size of the quantity of the material in there but the size of the secondary gives you enough to indicate that it's a reasonable quantity of material that was ignited by the exploding bomb.

QUESTION:

And just describing the location of this bomb, what's the best way to describe it? Was it in Syria?

DAVID JOHNSTON:

It was in Syria, it was in the Raqqah area.

JOE IERVASI:

So this was actually the deepest strike that we've conducted this far.

QUESTION:

Australia or [indistinct].

JOE IERVASI:

Australia.

QUESTION: 

Deepest meaning furthest into Syria.

JOE IERVASI:         

Yes.

QUESTION: 

No survivors? Anyone from… emerging subsequently?

JOE IERVASI:         

No.

QUESTION: 

So that means there were no survivors or…

JOE IERVASI:         

Well no, not exactly.

QUESTION: 

Do you have any idea of the depth of the complex, like would the tunnel follow [indistinct]?

JOE IERVASI:         

Once again we don't have those details.

DAVID JOHNSTON:

Enough room that they had had secondary access to it, so it was not a single access to the complex there were multiple access points to it, large enough that we had to try out alternative approaches.

QUESTION: 

Your intercepts, various types gauge get any reaction of Daesh (*)?

JOE IERVASI:         

Yeah so there were reflections, a reflection as opposed to that strike there certainly was a destruction in the local networks to both coordinate and eliminate so there was a destruction to their supplies so not only on weapons but we're anticipating explosives and munitions located in the cave as well.

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

The facility I suppose was also a control node for their operations as well. Removal of that would have caused a dislocation effect of its own, not only for people associated with it but the access of the infrastructure they were able to use.

QUESTION: 

When Islamic State went through Iraq, we understand, I looked through your briefings, it pulled a lot of military equipment captured from the Iraqi army back to areas like Raqqah. Would this be the sort of equipment in storage here?

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

Possibly. That mixed in with material they may have sourced from other areas that that's possible but we don't…

QUESTION: 

Do you have any sense as to how many of these kinds of nodes Islamic State's operations in Syria and Iraq might be like?

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

They have multiple- many locations where they have a presence and equipment and that is…

QUESTION: 

Hundreds?

DAVID JOHNSTON:           

They would be in the hundreds across both Iraq and Syria but that's where they've got this- of various scales they are dispersed in nature in part to mitigate the impact of a Coalition strike on one they have a dispersal approach to it so they number all different storage locations that they use to bring a strike on a particular one but there is a pattern of strike activity on their storage facilities.

JOE IERVASI:         

So what we assess post strike there is what new patterns of behaviours of Daesh have now had to adapt to because we're taking out a key node as well.

QUESTION: 

This was all one bomb strike, there was certainly more.

JOE IERVASI:         

So I think two. That was two, that was two.

QUESTION: 

Were the other six still in the same sort of strike mission?

JOE IERVASI:         

Yes, They all went down the same hole.

QUESTION: 

And what a rather big hole by the end of it, what did the landscape look, like after the raid? It's hard for us to observe those follow up bombs. Can you describe what we're seeing, had the complex collapsed?

JOE IERVASI:         

Yeah so certainly there was substantial- there was partial collapse of the cliff face which blocked the cave. In terms of how deep in the cave the disruption that happened inside the cave we can't assess [indistinct] walk through the actual strike you'll see it's a terrain that could face actually falling off and collapsing down here in [indistinct].

QUESTION: 

What threat to civilians would it mean?

JOE IERVASI:         

Hang on [indistinct], so our surveillance of patterns of life particularly to determine strike status, confirm that it was solely Daesh [indistinct] are going to and from this complex, although there was a matter of- a number of [indistinct] and dedicated surveillance just to develop this as a viable target and confirm there were no civilian present.

QUESTION: 

That's done by aerial surveillance.

JOE IERVASI:         

Well, there's aerial surveillance and we've got a number of other intelligence forms coming from human intelligence, signals intelligence, indications intelligence that complete the picture.

QUESTION: 

So, weeks of surveillance then, how does this plan [indistinct]?

JOE IERVASI:         

To actually plan the strike itself, the strike was planned within the normal Air Taskforce Cycle which was 72 hours.

QUESTION: 

So, the surveillance happened a few weeks before?

JOE IERVASI:         

Yep.

QUESTION: 

When did you decide, okay we need to start looking at this, location in the plan or was [indistinct].

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

Yes it was. I think- and I'll get Air Commodore Iervasi to describe the process to you but typically the work that is the intelligence preparation that is conducted over weeks or months depending on the nature of the target and the assets, [indistinct] surveillance that are available. What Air Commodore Iervasi is referring to is where the target has been confirmed and validated as a suitable target, it moves into the Air Tasking Cycle, that's specific that our process and that then generates [indistinct] dedicated to an aircraft mission.

JOE IERVASI:         

So, generally- if you like, I can describe that process as it plays out, so the general surveillance across both Iran and Syria are going on at all stages. When a- when an interest is identified, there's an increase in the surveillance placed over there and then it will go to a first process which is called a Joint Target Working Group. The Joint Target Working Group combines specialists from on the ground and in the air to assess whether this is a target that is worthy of a visit in the campaign plan and is worthy for further development. If it passes the Joint Target Working Group, which is chaired by a two star general, they will then pass through for further development. More intelligence and development from there and then it goes to what's called a Joint Target Coordination Board. The Joint Target Coordination Board at the first pass will determine is this now a valid target? Can we now start to push and allocate out for an attack. Once it's passed the Joint Target Coordination Board for the first time around, then the other coalition players will then start to look at it in detail, see what it is they can do to achieve the desired weapons effects to take out that particular target. So, it's approved as a target and it will subsequently come back to the- that's been prioritised and then it will go to the Joint Target Coordination Board a second time and they get it prioritised amongst the list of other targets that come up and they can be prioritised with one through to 100.

QUESTION: 

And you just described to us a three week process or is that another process?

JOE IERVASI:         

Well, it- depending on the complexity of the target, it could be many months, it could be as short as …

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

[Interrupts] What the Air Commodore is describing is what we call the Deliberate Cycle where you invest at giving the intelligence, bring a target together and deliberately move it through the other types of air strike activity. We've got [indistinct] dynamic and they're much more rapid depending on the events that are unfolding on the ground where, within that 72 hour cycle, first strike activities would be performed and that- the majority of our missions are of that dynamic nature and the deliberate events, while not irregular, are less frequent.

QUESTION: 

But this is a deliberate.

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

This is a deliberate.

QUESTION: 

[Indistinct] story tonight saying this is how it happened, [indistinct].

JOE IERVASI:         

[Indistinct] development.

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

Yes, that would be a reasonable assessment.

QUESTION: 

And during your surveillance of the site and your monitoring movements, a site like this might well be- was it used as a shelter by Daesh personnel, did you work out any idea of the number of Daesh personnel who might have actually been there?

DAVID JOHNSTON:          

Difficult to have a firm view on patterns of life, particularly if you brought that assessment, that it was an armed operation and