Response of 26 April 2013 provided to Rory Callinan of Fairfax Media to questions asked on 23 April 2013
6 May 2013General Statement
As with all combat deaths, an Inquiry Officer was appointed to examine the circumstances surrounding the death of Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney in Afghanistan on 24 August 2010.
The Inquiry Officer, who had access to initial reports and witnesses, noted that some members of the patrol had no view or appreciation of the conditions where Lance Corporal MacKinney was positioned when he was shot.
On 2 February 2012, Defence released the Inquiry Officer's report in to the death of Lance Corporal Jared MacKinney.
A copy of the redacted report is available at:
1. Fairfax understands Jared MacKinney replaced a lance corporal who was sent back to Australia soon after arriving in Afghanistan with psychological issues connected to a previous deployment. Why was this person even sent to Afghanistan if he had a pre-existing issue and did this put MacKinney in a difficult position?
Response:
The Inquiry Officer found that Lance Corporal MacKinney had completed all the pre-deployment training required of him and was fully qualified for his role as an infantry rifleman.
Defence will not comment on individual cases, however, all personnel who deploy on operations undergo a rigorous preparation and training program and are certified as fit to deploy by their chain of command.
Defence employs a multi-layered approach to mental health support including prevention, intervention and treatment to deal with mental health which can be employed before, during or after deployment.
Members on deployment have access to support from embedded health staff and fly in specialist teams. Psychology Support Teams provide critical incident mental health support on operations and conduct routine special psychological screens and interviews to target deployed groups considered to be at higher risk of exposure to potentially traumatic events.
2. Why did Defence take the decision to send home a corporal for striking (another soldier) for insubordination and was this an appropriate course of action and who replaced the corporal?
Response:
For privacy reasons Defence will not comment on specific issues relating to the alleged actions of individuals.
3. Some of those who took part in the battle of Derapet do not believe that appropriate attention was paid the critical email published in September 2010 in Australian newspapers about the battle. They believe it raised a number of valid points especially about the failure to use mortars especially given men in the aqueduct were caught on the helmet camera film as saying "Mortars are coming". Does Defence believe that these and other allegations made in the email have been fully resolved?
4. The argument that mortars were not employed because of concerns for civilian casualties has been questioned by some soldiers who say it was obvious that the civilian population had evacuated. They also argue that there did not seem to be similar concern about civilians when the ASLAV's were firing into the same areas and that the 155 eventually fired into the same area. What does Defence say to these claims?
Response Q3 and 4:
The Inquiry Officer found that the use of mortars during the contact would not have prevented the death of Lance Corporal MacKinney.
The Inquiry Officer’s terms of reference were expanded to consider the concerns of an individual who fought at Derapet which were raised in a private email regarding support provided to soldiers involved in the engagement.
The Inquiry Officer found the patrol into Derapet was duly authorised and was well planned. The Inquiry Officer found no weakness in the offensive fire support plan, or in the intelligence reporting process.
The Inquiry Officer also determined there was no failure to make mortar support available to the patrol. Coalition 120mm mortars were on site and an integral part of the fire support plan.
The Inquiry Officer found that the mortars were, in fact, ready for action but were not called on to fire.
It is important to note that both the Patrol Commander and the Joint Terminal Air Controller-qualified Forward Observer, whose specialist task is to coordinate joint fires, decided not to engage the enemy with mortars. In the Forward Observer’s professional opinion this was not an appropriate weapon system for the circumstances.
The Forward Observer determined that the Apache attack helicopters, in conjunction with direct fire support from the ASLAVs, were the best weapon system for this situation.
In addition, a senior Joint Fires Officer in Afghanistan conducted a subsequent review of the Forward Observer's actions.
This expert review validated the Forward Observer’s use of the ASLAVs and Apache attack helicopters as the preferred offensive fire support for these circumstances.
The expert review also confirmed that the use of mortars in this situation would have likely caused casualties to both our own troops and civilians within the area.
When interviewed as part of the inquiry, the soldier described his email as a form of “venting” as part of a grieving process for the loss of his close mate.
No action has been taken against the soldier who raised the issues.
4a. Fairfax is aware that the corporal who wrote the email was recommended, by three different soldiers for a Distinguished Service Medal. Why was this medal not awarded and was this because of his email and if so was this fair?
Response:
All nominations and deliberations regarding honours and awards remain classified as Honours-in-Confidence.
In general terms, the process for nominating and confirming operational honours and awards is:
Tactical Commanders nominate their personnel after acts of Gallantry or periods of distinguished service.
The nomination is considered by a board including senior tactical commanders, principle staff and the Regimental Sergeant Major.
The nomination is then submitted to the next higher headquarters (for example Headquarters Joint Task Force 633 in the Middle East).
A similar board process is undertaken and final nominations are then referred to Headquarters Joint Operations Command.
The Chief of Joint Operations chairs the final board, which also includes representatives from the Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations components, to consider nominations for acts of gallantry or periods of distinguished service on operations.
Following consideration by board members and their recommendations, the Chief of Joint Operations submits his final nominations to the Chief of the Defence Force.
Each stage in the tiered board process is conducted independently, allowing each level to consider the nominations on merit alone based on the information as presented.
At each level, board members may recommend the nomination is accepted as written, is upgraded to a higher level or downgraded to a lower award.
5. Was the battle for Derapet a failure given that Australia suffered one man killed in the action and could not hold the ground?
Response:
No. Derapet was an intense contact. Patrol members displayed extraordinary bravery and dedication to duty.
The Mentoring Task Force 1 and Afghan National Army partnered mission was to clear the village of Derapet in the Tangi Valley and set the conditions for future liaison with key village leaders.
The action at Derapet on 24 August paved the way for subsequent partnered ANA presence within the Tangi Valley. This has included the construction of a mentored ANA patrol base and a multitude of village engagement activities in this region.
6. What does Defence say to claims that Australian forces were never able to control Derapet and had to flee the village on two other occasions after coming under Taliban attack including an incident where soldiers were nearly over run in late 2010 and only escaped by throwing grenades at the attackers?
Response:
The action at Derapet on 24 August paved the way for subsequent partnered ANA presence within the Tangi Valley. This has included the construction of a mentored ANA patrol base and a multitude of village engagement activities in this region.
7. Some of those who fought at Derapet believe that Lance Corporal Mackinney should have been nominated for some award. Did Defence receive any recommendation for any award for him and if so what has happened to it? If not does Defence believe it should consider some sort of award given his leadership and bravery on the day in taking over the machine gun and attempting to operate the weapon in the face of very heavy enemy fire as well as his general demeanour?
Response:
All nominations and deliberations regarding honours and awards remain classified as Honours-in-Confidence.
8. What does Defence say to concerns that the awarding of the VC and four other decorations for the action of Derapet has a political purpose which is to re invent the battle and the deployment which had a high casualty rate, as a success?
Response:
Defence rejects this allegation which is offensive to the award recipients and Defence. The tiered board process outlined in detail at question 5 allows each level to consider the nominations on merit alone.
9. Fairfax is aware an extremely high number of soldiers who took part in the fighting that day at Derapet have psychological issues some of which is related to the ADF's treatment of them. What is Defence doing about this situation and how many soldiers have discharged from the 6RAR component that went on that deployment?
Response:
You have not provided evidence to substantiate your claim that the ADF's treatment of some soldiers has led to psychological issues. As such, Defence is unable to investigate your claims.
However, the ADF is committed to caring for its people. Defence works hard to encourage anyone who is concerned about their mental health to seek help as soon as possible.
Defence provides comprehensive health support to ADF personnel. The treatment and rehabilitation of wounded, injured or ill members is based on the clinical needs of the individual and not the cause of their condition.
The ADF employs a multi-layered approach to mental health support including prevention, intervention and treatment to deal with mental health issues.
Under the Support for Wounded Injured or Ill Program (SWIIP), Defence and DVA are working collaboratively to make what is generally a good system even better. SWIIP aims to deliver consistent support to all wounded, injured or ill members during their service and after transition from the ADF.
Issued by Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication,
Department of Defence,
Canberra, ACT
Phone: 02 6127 1999 Fax: 02 6265 6946
